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NOTES
CONTEMPT: DIRECT AND INDIRECT CONTEMPT-WHAT CONSTITUTES "IMMEDIATE
VIEW AND PRESENCE."-Tardiness manifests a slovenly professional attitude. It can
also get you five days in the county jail. In Lyons v. Superior Court' the petitioner
was sole counsel for the defense in a felony prosecution. He arrived forty-five minutes
after the jury trial was scheduled to resume and was orally ordered to show cause why
he should not be held in contempt for his absence. Petitioner replied that he had
overslept in his office as a result of a very bad cold and insufficient sleep. The court
refused to believe this, summarily adjudged the petitioner in contempt, and sentenced
him to serve five days in the county jail.
Upon a certiorari proceeding the petitioner sought annulment of this order
adjudging him guilty of a direct contempt of court. He urges there was no contempt,
but that if any occurred it was indirect in that it was not committed within the
immediate view and presence of the court. Therefore it could be punished only after
affidavit, notice, and hearing, as provided for by statute.
2
The question thus raised is whether a person's absence can be deemed con-
temptuous conduct within the immediate view and presence of the court?
The courts have generally defined contempt as "a despising of the authority,
justice, or dignity of the court."' 3 In other words, one whose conduct tends to bring
the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard; or otherwise
tends to impede, embarrass, or obstruct the court in the discharge of its duties, is
guilty of contempt.
Contempts are classified as either direct or indirect. A direct contempt is one
committed in the immediate view and presence of the court. All others e.g., attempt to
influence a juror during recess, newspaper publication contemptuous to court, and
advising a client to violate a court order or decree, are indirect contempts. 4
The determination of whether or not the contemptuous conduct was "committed
in the immediate view and presence of the court" has presented a difficult problem
to the courts. The cases have generally held that a contempt has occurred within the
"immediate view and presence" when the court can rely upon its own senses as a
criteria of the truth, and that where it requires evidence of others, the contempt is
indirect.'
The California Supreme Court in the instant case held that the petitioner's
absence from the court when he was obligated to be present interrupted the court's
proceedings as effectively as any other contemptuous conduct within the court's
presence and view.6 Thus the court is saying that the attorney's absence constituted
direct contempt.
Such a finding is quite unrealistic since absence itself is not conduct which
amounts to "a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court." Rather
absence, at its very best, is a mere result of such conduct. Surely, it is not difficult
to imagine any number of reasons, some legitimate, others perhaps contemptuous,
for which the accused could have been absent. At any rate, it should be apparent
1 43 Cal.2d 755,278 P.2d 681 (1955).
CALIF. CODE OF CIV. PROC. §§ 1211, 1212, 1217.
In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 217 Pac. 73 (1893).
McClatchy v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. 413, 51 Pac. 696 (1897).
Klein v. United States, 151 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; People v. Hagopian, 343 IlM. App. 640,
99 N.E.2d 726 (1951) ; Provenzale v. Provenzale, 339 Ill. App. 345, 90 N.E.2d 115 (1950).
643 Cal.2d at 759, 278 P.2d at 683.
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that whatever contempt could be involved under these circumstances would lie in
the conduct causing the absence and not in the absence itself. From this it follows
that whatever contemptuous conduct does exist, i.e., whatever reason caused the
contemnor to be absent, is not before the court. The reason for the absence is not
within the immediate view and presence of the court and therefore the court cannot
through its personal knowledge alone determine whether or not a contempt exists.
Instead it requires extrinsic evidence of the contempt, and this, in all fairness
to the accused, should be brought out only through the proper proceedings such as
are available to those accused of an indirect contempt. It has been held that a doubt
as to whether a contemnor has been guilty of a direct or indirect contempt, should
be resolved in favor of the indirect contempt.
7
The distinction between a direct and indirect contempt is of importance primarily
in its effect upon the proceedings taken to determine the guilt or innocence of the
contemnor.
8
The procedure involved in punishing an indirect contempt necessitates serving
the accused with notice or an order to show cause containing a formal statement of
the charge against him, and he must be given opportunity to plead and answer
such charge.9
On the other hand, when a direct contempt occurs the court may, upon its own
knowledge of the facts, without further proof, issue or trial, and without hearing an
explanation of the motives of the offender immediately proceed to determine whether
the facts justify punishment and to inflict such punishment as seems proper within
the limits allowed by law. 10 This proceeding is termed a summary proceeding.
It has been suggested, in regard to judicial proceedings that the constitutional
guaranties of due process of law normally require that the accused shall have
notice and an opportunity to present his defense."' Such notice and hearing of course,
are necessary lest the charge be false or inaccurate. In other words, the accused is
guaranteed the right that the court will not render a judgment without first having
had all the relevant facts presented to it.
In the light of the foregoing let us review the proceedings involved in these
two classes of contempt. In the case of an indirect contempt, formal notice and
hearing are given to the defendant. Thus we see the accused is given an opportunity
to shed more light upon an occurrence which did not take place within the immediate
view and presence of the court. Due process is therefore not wanting. A review of the
summary proceedings involved in an action for a direct contempt shows that notice
and hearing may be dispensed with. Is this not a denial of due process? Not at all.
In such a case the court is in a position to witness the entire act of contempt and
by so doing, its own personal knowledge takes the place of evidence and makes a
trial an idle ceremony. Hence it was held that displaying an armed weapon, fighting,
using profanity, etc., while the court was in session, were acts of such a nature that
no reasonable person could have doubted that a contempt of court had occurred.
Therefore, no question of fact arose and a hearing could be dispensed with without
any prejudice or denial of due process of law to the accused. 12
" Ex parte Redmond, 159 Miss. 449, 132 So. 328 (1931).8 Lapique v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App. 407, 229 Pac. 1010 (1924).
9 Reymert v. Smith, 5 Cal.App. 380, 90 Pac. 470 (1907).
10 Ex parte Sullivan, 10 Okl. Cr. 465, 138 Pac. 815 (1914) ; 12 Am. JuR., Contempt § 61 (1938).
" 16 CJ.S., Constitutional Law § 611 (1939).
1" Ex parte Clark, 208 Mo. 121, 106 S.W. 990 (1907).
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